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Abstract	
If	it	is	true,	as	Pat	Carlen	(2010)	claims,	that	contemporary	‘justice’	policies	are	exhibiting	all	
the	 signs	 of	 ‘penal	 populism’	 and	 ‘risk	 crazed	 governance’,	 then	 social	 democratic	
criminologists	 face	 the	 dual	 challenge	 of	 explaining	 why	 these	 policies	 are	 not	 only	 not	
working	but	also	how	this	fact	continues	to	be	explained	away.	At	stake	here	are	two	central	
questions:	 firstly,	 what	 grounds	 are	 available	 to	 secure	 the	 intellectual	 legitimacy	 of	
criminology;	 and,	 secondly,	what	ways	 of	 knowing	 could	 secure	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 social‐
democratic	criminology.	The	paper	begins	by	exploring	what	is	at	stake	when	what	appears	
to	 be	 a	 very	 large	 number	 of	 criminologists	 claim	 that	 theirs	 is	 an	 ‘empirical	 scientific’	
discipline.	 The	 paper	 argues	 that	 neither	 mainstream	 criminology	 nor	 social	 democratic	
criminology	 can	 base	 any	 claims	 to	 intellectual	 legitimacy	 by	 relying	 on	 an	 ‘empirical	
scientific’	frame.	The	paper	draws	on	Spencer	(1987)	to	advance	the	‘unpalatable	thesis’	that,	
as	far	as	the	actual	practice	by	conventional	criminologists	of	their	kind	of	social	science	goes,	
‘they	do	not	know	what	they	are	doing’	(Spencer	1987:	333)	and	that	their	ignorance	of	this	
fact	has	serious	consequences	for	the	progress	of	their	field.	The	paper	shows	that	there	is	a	
gap	 between	 the	 actual	 practice	 of	 conventional	 criminology	 and	 its	 claims	 to	 ‘scientific	
empiricism’:	what	is	actually	on	offer	is	an	‘imperfect	empiricism’.The	long‐forgotten	work	of	
Bentham,	adumbrated	by	Vaihinger	(1935)	and	Fuller	(1967),	is	then	traced	and	some	of	the	
implications	of	 this	 theory	of	 fictions	 for	contemporary	representations	of	crime	are	noted.	
One	 implication	 briefly	 charted	 here	 is	 that	 any	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 needs	 to	
rehabilitate	the	proper	role	played	by	fictions	as	they	grapple	with	the	‘wicked	problems’	that	
currently	populate	this	field.	The	long‐standing	affectation	of	‘scientific	empiricism’	by	many	
practicing	criminologists	has	long	camouflaged	the	inability	of	conventional	criminologists	to	
address	what	are	properly	‘wicked	problems’.	
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Introduction	
Neo‐liberalism	 is	 a	 notoriously	 fuzzy	 category	 rendering	 it	 open	 variously	 to	misuse	 (Clarke	
2008)	or	 to	encouraging	unwarranted	pessimism	(Ferguson	2009).	Undeterred,	Fourcade	and	
Healey	 (2007:	 287)	 suggest	 that,	 provided	 we	 understand	 neo‐liberalism	 as	 a	 policy	 project	
which	praises	‘the	moral	benefits	of	market	society’	and	treats	‘markets	as	a	necessary	condition	
for	freedom	in	other	aspects	of	 life’,	then	it	has	some	use	value.	There	is	now	some	consensus	
that	 a	wide	 range	of	 contemporary	public	policies	 sponsored	by	neo‐liberal	 governments	 are	
not	working.	Writers	 like	 Clarke	 (2004),	 Beer	 et	 al.	 (2006),	 Engel	 (2007),	 Carlen	 (2010)	 and	
Connell	(2013)	have	shown	how	this	project	produces	increasingly	dysfunctional	effects	in	most	
policy	domains.	It	 is	generally	agreed,	even	by	the	OECD	(2011),	that	the	imbrications	of	state	
policy‐making	 and	 market‐driven	 processes	 in	 countries	 like	 Australia,	 the	 USA	 and	 the	 UK	
have,	for	example,	produced	high	levels	of	social	 inequality	and	disadvantage	and	exacerbated	
social	problems	like	crime	(Coburn	2000;	Pridemore	2011;	Wilkinson	and	Pickett	2009).		
	
As	this	paper	argues,	this	creates	certain	possibilities	as	well	as	problems	for	criminology.	For	
one	 thing,	 as	 social	 inequality	has	 increased,	 governments	wedded	 to	a	neo‐liberal	 imaginary	
have	 talked	 about	 attacking	 ‘social	 exclusion’	 and	 ‘social	 justice’	 while	 simultaneously	
implementing	fiscal	and	social	policies	which	exacerbate	social	inequality	and	increasing	crime	
rates;	and	pursuing	tough	‘law	’n	order’	policy	agendas	which	generate	increased	imprisonment	
rates	 (ABS	 2012).	 In	 consequence,	 as	 Hogeveen	 and	Woolford	 (2012)	 point	 out,	mainstream	
criminologists	are	now	implicated	in	the	expanding	domain	of	neo‐liberalism,	something	which	
prescient	 critics	 like	 (Wacquant	 1996)	 and	 Young	 (1999)	 had	 argued	 back	 in	 the	 1990s,	
threatened	 even	 then	 to	 push	 conventional	 criminology	 into	 respectively	 ‘self‐inflicted	
irrelevance’	or	‘administrative	complicity’.		
	
Critical	 criminologists	 (Martel	 et	 al.	 2006)	 and	 criminologists	 who	 have	 explicitly	 identified	
their	commitment	to	a	social	democratic	project	 (Reiner	2006),	confront	a	comparable	mix	of	
risk	 and	 opportunity.	 For	 if,	 as	 Carlen	 (2010)	 has	 noted,	 contemporary	 ‘justice’	 policies	 are	
exhibiting	all	the	signs	of	‘penal	populism’	(Pratt	and	Clarke	2005;	Roberts	et	al.	2003)	and	‘risk	
crazed	governance’	 (Carlen	2010),	 social	 democratic	 criminologists	 face	 the	dual	 challenge	of	
explaining	not	only	why	 these	policies	are	not	working	but	also	how	this	 fact	continues	 to	be	
explained	away.	This	is	a	challenge	because	as	Young	(1987:	337)	had	noted	a	long	time	ago:		
	
The	trouble	with	criminology	is	that	it	cannot	explain	crime.	And	being	unable	to	
explain	the	phenomenon,	its	persistent,	if	diverse	suggestions	as	to	how	to	tackle	
the	 problem,	 grind	 to	 a	 halt	 in	 a	mire	 of	 recidivism,	 overcrowded	 prisons	 and	
failed	experiments.	
	
I	propose	here	to	do	several	things.	I	begin	by	examining	the	grounds	upon	which	criminologists	
have	set	out	to	establish	their	credibility.	What	is	at	stake	here	are	two	fundamental	questions:	
firstly,	what	grounds	are	available	 to	secure	 the	 intellectual	 legitimacy	which	criminology	can	
claim	 for	 itself;	 and,	 secondly,	what	ways	 of	 knowing	might	 secure	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 social	
democratic	criminology.1	I	am	especially	interested	here	in	what	is	at	stake	when	what	appears	
to	be	a	very	large	number	of	criminologists	claim	that	theirs	is	an	‘empirical	scientific’	discipline.	
The	need	to	think	about	this	is	posed	when	criminologists	in	general,	and	leading	criminologists	
like	Reiner	(2006)	and	Garland	(2009)	 in	particular,	puzzle	about	 the	contemporary	status	of	
public	criminology.	Garland’s	(2009:	118)	claim	that	‘criminology’s	object	is	not	a	self‐generated	
theoretical	 entity	 or	 a	 naturally‐occurring	 phenomenon	 but	 instead	 a	 state‐deﬁned	 social	
problem’	and	Reiner’s	(2006)	account	of	what	he	says	defines	a	‘social	democratic	tradition’	in	
criminology	 raise,	 in	 sharp	 fashion,	 some	 basic	 questions	 about	 the	 authorising	 grounds	
available	 to	 criminology	 in	 general	 or	 to	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 in	 particular.	 Among	
these	authorising	grounds,	the	basis	of	criminology’s	claim	that	either	mainstream	criminology	
or	 a	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 can	 rest	 any	 claims	 to	 intellectual	 legitimacy	 on	 its	
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‘empirical’	methods	 is	 highly	problematic	 for	 a	number	of	 reasons.	 I	 draw	on	Spencer	 (1987:	
331)	 to	 advance	 the	 unpalatable	 thesis	 that,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 actual	 practice	 by	 conventional	
criminologists	of	their	kind	of	social	science	goes,	‘they	do	not	know	what	they	are	doing’,	and	
that	their	ignorance	of	this	fact	has	serious	consequences	for	the	progress	of	their	field.	My	task	
in	 this	 respect	 is	 quite	 modest.	 I	 want	 only	 to	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 actual	
practice	 of	 conventional	 criminology,	 which	 in	 its	 dominant	 mode	 deploys	 an	 ‘imperfect	
empiricism’,	and	the	putative	practice	of	criminology	as	‘scientific	empiricism’claim	to	credible	
knowledge	stands	out.		
	
As	I	argue	here,	this	gap	needs	to	be	thought	about	by	social	democratic	criminologists.	So,	too,	
does	 the	way	Foucauldian	 and	 ‘poststructuralist’	 critics	 have	 often	 targeted	 the	 ‘scientism’	 of	
modernist	 criminology.	 Again,	 though	 I	 cannot	make	 this	 case	 here,	 these	 critiques	 have	 not	
been	 all	 that	 effective,	 arguably	 because	 this	 critique	 has	 been	 ‘foreign’	 to	 the	 intellectual	
traditions	out	of	which	Anglo‐American	criminology	emerged.	We	should	note	that	Foucauldian	
and	‘poststructuralist’	critics	have	not	been	all	that	persuasive	in	explaining	both	why	modern	
‘risk‐crazed	penality’	or	‘penal	populist’	policies	are	not	working,	and	how	this	continues	to	be	
explained	away.		
	
Secondly,	 to	 address	 some	 of	 these	 issues	 and	 to	 be	 helpful,	 I	 want	 to	 rehabilitate	 a	 long‐
forgotten	English	 tradition	 initiated	by	 Jeremy	Bentham.	Carlen	 (2010)	 got	 it	 half‐right	when	
she	pointed	to	the	value	of	Vaihinger’s	(1935)	account	of	‘fictions’	as	a	possibly	fruitful	way	for	a	
social	democratic	criminology	to	proceed.	As	 I	show	here,	 it	was	really	Bentham	in	the	1770s	
who	first	drew	attention	to	the	role	played	by	fictions	in	human	knowledge	and	social	practice.	
Fictions	are	understood	as	categories	or	propositions	‘…	propounded	with	a	complete	or	partial	
consciousness	 of	 [their]	 falsity,	 or	 …	 recognised	 as	 having	 utility’	 (Fuller	 1967).	 The	 point	 is	
simple:	 if	 fictions	play	a	central	yet	 little	understood	role	 in	 the	 field	of	 ‘modern	criminology’,	
then	‘theory	of	fictions’	has	potentially	much	to	offer	to	a	social	democratic	criminology.		
	
The	 paper	 traces	 out	 briefly	 the	 long‐forgotten	 work	 of	 Bentham,	 adumbrated	 by	 Vaihinger	
(1935)	and	Fuller	 (1967),	and	points	 to	some	of	 the	 implications	of	 this	 theory	of	 fictions	 for	
contemporary	representations	of	crime.	One	implication,	again	quickly	charted	here,	is	that	any	
social	democratic	 criminology	needs	 to	 rehabilitate	 the	proper	role	played	by	 fictions	as	 they	
grapple	 with	 the	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 that	 currently	 populate	 this	 field.	 The	 long‐standing	
affectation	of	‘scientific	empiricism’	by	many	practicing	criminologists	has	long	camouflaged	the	
inability	of	conventional	criminologists	to	address	what	are	properly	‘wicked	problems’	(Rittel	
and	 Webber	 1973).	 As	 Bentham	 and	 Vaihinger	 understood,	 fictions	 wisely	 used	 add	
immeasurably	 to	 our	 capacity	 to	 live	 and	 do	well:	misused,	 they	merely	 cause	 confusion	 and	
mischief.	Let	me	start	with	modern	criminology.	
	
As	Garland	(1992:	412)	noted,	criminology	has	always	had	a	number	of	competing	frameworks	
to	work	with	which	may	explain	why	it	has	long	been	dogged	by	debates	about	the	best	criteria	
‘for	the	production	of	valid	criminological	knowledge’.	Equally	it	is	clear	that,	since	9/11,	there	
has	been	a	good	deal	of	 soul	 searching	by	 criminologists	 about	 the	 status	of	 criminology	 (for	
example,	Bennet	2004;	Hudson	2009).	 Some	of	 that	disquiet	 is	 reflected	 in	debates	about	 the	
‘public	role	of	criminology’	(Barak	2009;	Currie	2007;	Loader	and	Sparks	2010;	Turner	2013).	
That	there	is	something	seriously	amiss	is	clear.	
	
On	 the	one	hand,	 some,	 like	Garland	 (1992,	 2009),	 insist	 that	 criminology	 is	 a	pluralist,	 even	
radically	 eclectic	 enterprise.	 As	 Garland	 (2009)	 notes,	 criminology	 investigates	 a	 very	 large	
array	 of	 problems	 and	 uses	 a	 range	 of	 research	 methods	 and	 data	 sets	 of	 every	 description	
while	 drawing	 on	 a	wide	 spectrum	 of	 theoretical	 perspectives	 and	 disciplines	 like	 sociology,	
psychology,	 law,	history,	anthropology,	public	health,	biology,	economics	and	political	science.	
That	eclecticism	parallels:	
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	…	 competing	 visions	 of	 what	 criminology	 ought	 to	 be	 –	 criminology	 as	
experimental	 science;	 criminology	 as	 social	 science;	 criminology	 as	 policy	
prescription;	 criminology	 as	 security	 management;	 criminology	 as	 criminal	
justice	training;	criminology	as	public	discourse.	(Garland	2009:	117)	
	
On	the	other	hand,	others	like	Turner	(2013:	151‐3)	insist	that	scepticism	about	the	‘quality’	of	
criminology	 research‐based	 knowledge	 continues	 to	 haunt	 criminology	 because	 it	 remains	 a	
‘pluralist’	 enterprise	 and	 generates	 ‘exasperation	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 sheer	 diversity	 of	
criminological	 theories,	methods	 and	 findings’.	 She	 says	 this	 reflects	what	 ‘many,	 if	 not	most	
criminologists	…	would	now	accept,	that	the	kind	of	knowledge	or	“truth”	that	emerges	at	any	
given	time	is	a	contingent,	temporary	and	socially	constructed	thing’	(Turner	2013:	157).		
	
Yet	 these	 different	 evaluations	 of	 the	 ‘pluralism’	 or	 ‘eclecticism’	 in	 modern	 criminology	 are	
especially	odd	given	what	most	criminologists	actually	do.	A	good	deal	of	research	points	to	a	
persistent	and	strong	consensus	in	practice.	What	any	number	of	studies	of	what	gets	published	
as	criminological	research	shows	is	that	criminology	has	long	represented	itself	in	the	USA,	the	
UK	and,	to	some	extent,	in	Australia	as	an	‘empirical’	science	with	a	dominant,	though	far	from	
exclusive	 preference,	 for	 ‘objective’,	 ‘quantitative	 research’.	 Typical	 early	 studies,	 like	Holmes	
and	 Taggart’s	 (1990)	 review	 of	 three	 major	 criminology	 journals	 (1976‐1988),	 pointed	 to	 a	
preponderance	of	what	they	call	‘inductive	and	quantitative	empiricist	methods’	accounting	for	
between	 63	 per	 cent	 to	 76	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 articles	 published.	 DiChristina	 (1997)	 concurred,	
showing	 that	 most	 criminological	 research	 was	 focussed	 ‘primarily’	 on	 quantification	 and	
replication.	Espeland	claimed	that	numbers	were	‘…	a	useful	defence	against	the	particular	and	
the	subjective’	and	fulfilled	the	need	for	‘replication	and	validation’	(Espeland	1997:	395)	over	
time,	across	cultures	and	state	boundaries.	Worrall	(2000)	argued	that	criminologists	pursued	
‘causal	 explanations’	 and	 relied	 on	 ‘correlational	 research	 designs,	 cross‐sectional	 data	 and	
multivariate	 statistics	 [sic]’	 because	 of	 the	 ‘predictive’	 value	 and	 influence	 of	 quantitative	
research	 on	 criminal	 justice	 research.	 (The	 drift	 from	 observation	 to	 advocacy	 seems	 to	
encourage	obscuring	the	difference	between	‘causal’	and	‘correlational’	claims).	Worrall	(2000)	
also	pointed	 to	a	 steady	 increase	 in	 this	preference	over	 the	 study	period.	 In	 the	 twenty‐first	
century,	Kleck	at	al.	(2006)	paint	a	similar	picture	from	their	survey	of	every	article	in	the	seven	
most	highly	ranked	criminology	journals	(2001‐02).	Survey	research	was	the	dominant	method,	
cross‐sectional	 non‐experimental	 designs	 predominated,	 and	multivariate	 statistical	 methods	
were	 the	 norm,	 accounting	 ‘for	 88.9	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 articles’	 (Buckler	 2008:	 149).	 Buckler	
confirmed,	 in	 his	 study	 of	 leading	 criminology	 journals	 between	 2003‐07,	 that	 quantitative	
research	accounted	for	approximately	90	per	cent	of	the	articles.	Research	by	Tewkesbury	et	al.	
(2005)	and	Tewkesbury	et	al.	 (2010)	confirmed	that	quantitative	research	continued	to	make	
up	 the	 overwhelming	 proportion	 of	 published	 research.	 Their	 2005	 survey	 of	 five	 leading	
criminology	and	criminal	justice	journals	for	the	years	1998‐2002	established	that	only	6.5	per	
cent	used	a	qualitative	research	design,	while	the	later	2010	study	which	surveyed	410	articles	
in	sixteen	leading	criminology	and	criminal	justice	journals	(2004‐08)	indicated	that	73	per	cent	
used	quantitative	methods.	More	 recently,	Nolasco	 et	 al.	 (2010:	 5)	 agreed	 that	 criminological	
research	 ‘focuses	 on	 numerical	 objectivity	 and	 quantification	 …	 which	 ensures	 less	
arbitrariness’.	My	 own	 survey	 of	 criminology	 in	 Australia	 (using	Australian	and	New	Zealand	
Journal	of	Criminology	between	2008	and	2011)	suggests	Australian	criminology	is	slightly,	but	
not	 significantly,	 more	 pluralist.	 The	 initial	 privileging	 of	 ‘quantitative’	 studies	 (running	 at	 a	
ratio	of	7:11	 in	years	2008‐09)	changed	after	2010	as	non‐quantitative	papers	 (ratio	of	10:7)	
forged	ahead.	
	
If	 we	 pay	 closer	 attention	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 discussion	 about	 the	 state	 of	 criminology,	 we	 see	
several	 problematic	 propositions.	 One	 of	 those	 things	 is	 the	 unexamined	 conflation	 of	 ‘the	
empirical’	 with	 ‘quantitative	 research’.	 Another	 is	 the	 inability	 to	 say	what	 it	 is	 that	 actually	
defines	research	as	‘empirical’.		
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This	is	evident	in	an	exemplary	kind	of	confusion	which	Garland	(2009:	118)	falls	into.	Setting	
out	to	explain	why	criminology	has	been	successful	in	the	ways	he	has	enumerated,	in	spite	of	
the	eclecticism	he	says	characterises	modern	criminology,	Garland	insists	that:	
	
Unlike	 other	 sciences	 and	 well‐constituted	 academic	 disciplines,	 criminology’s	
object	 is	 not	 a	 self‐generated	 theoretical	 entity	 or	 a	 naturally‐occurring	
phenomenon	but	instead	a	state‐deﬁned	social	problem	and	the	means	by	which	
that	problem	is	managed.		
	
Two	things	can	be	said.	One	is	that	Garland’s	comment	targeted	a	discipline	where	there	is	no	
agreed‐on	naturally	occurring	theoretical	‘object’.	Indeed,	he	is	merely	adumbrating	Foucault’s	
(1980:	226)	trenchant	observation	that	the	‘fate	of	criminology’	has	always	been	dependent	‘on	
the	 disciplinary	 power	 that	 shaped	 it'.	 As	 Luna	 (2010:	 249)	 notes,	 disciplines	 are	 generally	
understood	to	require	an	explicit	conceptual	object	on	which	to	focus	their	enquiries.	As	Fattah	
(1997:	 37)	 has	 pointed	 out,	 while	 mainstream	 criminologists	 have	 insisted	 that	 ‘crime’	 is	 a	
natural	 and/or	 social	 reality,	 the	 quest	 to	 demonstrate	 this	 proposition	 has	 so	 far	 been	
unsuccessful.	 Alternative	 criminologists	 have	 not	 done	 any	 better	 in	 terms	 of	 providing	 a	
univocal	 conception	 of	 crime	which	might	 serve	 as	 the	 legitimate	 object	 of	 criminology.	 This	
seems	to	have	provoked	Cohen	(1992),	a	leading	alternative	criminologist,	who	granted	that,	if	
‘crime’	was	an	object	imposed	on	criminology,	then	criminologists	needed	to	–	or	should	–	work	
out	what	this	object	is	by	trying	to	move	beyond	a	legalistic	deﬁnition	of	crime	and	developing	a	
‘scientiﬁc’	 one,	 ‘independent	 from	 politicians	 and	 legislators’.	 (It	 is	 generally	 agreed	 that	 he	
failed	 to	 make	 this	 case.)	 In	 this	 respect,	 we	 can	 therefore	 say,	 secondly,	 that	 Cohen	 tacitly	
agreed	 with	 Garland	 that	 indeed	 ‘crime’	 is	 whatever	 a	 ‘state’	 defines	 it	 to	 be’.	 Granted	 this,	
Garland’s	 proposition	 has	 a	 lot	 to	 commend	 it:	 as	 (Bottoms	 2000)	 insists,	 the	 criminological	
research	object	–	‘crime’	and	its	control	–	is	a	political	and	moral	construct.		
	
However	 Garland	 muddies	 the	 water	 somewhat	 when	 he	 adds	 that:	 ‘Criminology’s	 basic	
organising	principle	is	the	empirical	study	of	crime	and	its	control	–	which	is	to	say,	the	study	of	
a	 legally‐defined	 entity	 [emphasis	 added]	 and	 a	 state‐directed	 practice’	 (Garland	 2009:	 118).	
Seemingly	undaunted	by	the	precariousness	of	this	cascade	of	claims,	the	central	confusion	I	am	
concerned	 with	 here	 is	 fully	 revealed	 when	 Garland	 (2009:	 118),	 having	 pointed	 to	 the	
ostensibly	‘empirical’	basis	of	criminology,	goes	on	to	add	(self‐referencing	an	earlier	discussion	
(Garland	2002))	that	‘criminology	is	intimately	(at	the	epistemological	level)	and	directly	(at	the	
social	level)	tied	into	government’.2		
	
Unless	Garland	is	proposing	a	major,	unheralded	and	unexplicated	radical	redefinition	of	what	
our	account	of	 the	 ‘empirical’	means,	 this	 is	horribly	 confused.	 If	 ‘empiricism’	has	ever	meant	
anything,	 it	 means	 knowledge	 claims	 based	 on	 theory‐free	 observations	 and	 experiences	 of	
realia	(that	is,	‘things’	amenable	to	sensory	examination)	and	not	whatever	is	mandated	either	
by	 ‘theoretical	 assumptions’,	 ‘ethical	 ideas’	 or	 by	political	 agencies.	 As	 Hacking	 (1983:	 41‐2)	
puts	 it,	 empiricists	 have	 long	 held	 that	 judgments	 about	 truth	 or	 falsity	 can	 be	 settled	 by	
empirical	enquiry	‘where	the	deliverances	of	sight,	hearing	and	touch	provide	the	best	basis	for	
scientiﬁc	 inference’.	 There	 can	be	 little	doubt,	 as	numerous	 criminologists	have	 testified,	 that	
‘crime’	is	indeed	‘a	state‐deﬁned	social	problem’,	and	that	when	Garland	refers	to	criminology	as	
something	 to	 be	 understood	 at	 an	 ‘epistemological	 level’,	 he	 really	 means	 to	 say	 that	 any	
epistemological	 issues	 have	 been	 dissolved	 by	 a	 political	 decision:	 crime	 is	 less	 an	
‘epistemological’	 entity	 and	 more	 a	 ‘political’	 artefact.	 As	 someone	 influenced	 by	 Foucault,	
Garland	 presumably	 intends	 us	 to	 understand	 that	 truth,	 for	 example,	 is	 simply	 an	 effect	 of	
power.	Yet	taken	seriously,	this	would	have	the	effect	of	rendering	any	kind	of	criminology	into	
a	 parasitic	 pseudo‐intellectual	 enterprise	 whose	 credibility	 is	 simply	 adjudicated	 by	 or	
authorised	by	 the	 state.	 Yet	 this	 surely	 begs	 too	many	questions	 of	 the	 kind	 raised	 by	 Finnis	
(1981)	or	Nagel	(1996)	when	they	point	to	the	self‐negating	absurdities	implied	by	those	who	
claim	‘there	is	no	such	thing	as	truth’	or	that	‘truth	is	an	effect	of	power’.	
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What	of	 the	 social	democratic	 tradition?	As	Reiner	 (2006)	notes,	while	 the	 ‘social	democratic	
criminology’	label	has	been	used	by	writers	like	Taylor	(1982)	and	Downes	(1983,	1988),	‘it	has	
never	been	a	self‐espoused	label’	(Reiner	2006:	7).	He	sets	about	trying	to	clarify	what	the	social	
democratic	 tradition	 entails.	 In	 terms	 which	 imply	 the	 need	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 ontological,	
epistemological	 and	 practical	 dimensions	 of	 criminology,	 Reiner	 (2006:	 8)	 proposes	 that	 the	
social	 democratic	 tradition	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 ‘a	 set	 of	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 human	
action,	ethics,	and	political	economy	that	broadly	correspond	to	the	most	common	meaning	of	
the	term	“social	democratic”’.	At	this	level	of	abstractness,	few	would	quibble	that	themes	like	a	
critique	of	capitalism,	the	pursuit	of	social	equality	through	democratic	means,	and	an	interest	
in	social	justice	comprise	some	of	the	important	dimensions	of	the	social	democratic	tradition.		
	
However	Reiner	is	much	less	convincing	when	he	starts	to	spell	out	the	details	of	what	he	means	
both	 by	 social	 democracy	 per	 se,	 and	 by	 the	 ‘social	 democratic	 tradition’	 in	 criminology,	
especially	when	he	identifies	exemplars	who	he	says	represent	social	democratic	criminology.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 he	 claims	 that,	 while	 it	 suffers	 from	 a	 certain	 taxonomic	 fuzziness,	 ‘social	
democracy’	 refers	 to	 a	 ‘Marxist	 tradition	 of	 parliamentary	 socialism	 which	 is	 positioned	
between	liberalism	and	communism’	(Reiner	2006:	9).	However,	on	the	other	hand,	Reiner	also	
wants	to	include	‘mixed	economy	welfare	states	in	the	UK	and	the	Rooseveltian	New	Deal	in	the	
United	States’	 (Reiner	2006:	9)	 in	the	social	democratic	 tradition.	He	only	muddies	the	water,	
however,	when	he	adds	 that,	 in	 the	1990s,	 ‘Blair	 and	Giddens,	 explicitly	 sought	 to	 triangulate	
this	“social	democracy”	and	neo‐liberalism’	(Reiner	2006:	8).	This	portrait	of	social	democracy	
seems	 less	 than	 likely	 to	 win	 support	 from	 political	 theorists	 who	 might	 wish	 to	 insist	 on	
distinctions	 between	 ‘social	 democracy’,	 ‘laborism’	 ‘social	 liberalism’,	 (especially	 as	 Keynes	
framed	it)	and	Fabian	socialism	(Beilharz	1993;	Bevir	2002;	Collini	1991;	Massey	1994).	Others	
(for	example,	Lipset	1980)	would	observe	that	the	US	has	never	sustained	a	social	democratic	
tradition.	
	
As	for	social	democratic	criminology,	Reiner	claims	that,	for	a	long	time,	it	was	simply	that	‘way	
of	understanding	and	responding	to	crime	that	was	widespread,	perhaps	dominant,	for	much	of	
the	twentieth	century’	(2006:	7)	but	later	strengthens	this	to	claim	to	say	it	was	‘the	dominant	
paradigm’	 (2006:	 37)	 in	 criminology,	 supplying	 the	 ‘quintessential	 elements	 of	 “penal	
modernism”’	 (2006:	21).	Further	this	 ‘dominant	paradigm’	consisted	 in	 ‘…	a	deep	structure	of	
shared	 assumptions	 that	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 social	 democratic’	 (2006:	 9).	 To	 that	 bold	
claim	he	 adds	 that:	 ‘The	quintessential	 expression	 of	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 is	Robert	
Merton’s	 seminal	 formulation	 of	 anomie	 theory’,	 adding	 that	 ‘In	 Britain	 its	 clearest	 exponent	
was	Hermann	Mannheim’	(Reiner	2006:	9).		
	
The	 first	 thing	 to	 be	 said	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 or	 analysis	 offered	 to	 support	 the	
proposition	 that	 the	 social	 democratic	 ‘tradition’	 constituted	 ‘the	 dominant	 paradigm’	 in	
criminology.	Accordingly,	there	is	no	discussion	of	whether	the	leading	British	criminologists	of	
decades	 from	 the	 1920s	 to	 the	 1950s	 (like	 Goring,	 Burt,	 or	West)	 or	 American	 figures	 (like	
Thrasher,	Sutherland	and	Hughes	of	the	Chicago	school	or	the	Gluecks)	were	social	democrats.	
The	same	can	be	said	for	the	idea	that	Merton	or	Mannheim	were	social	democratically	inclined,	
a	claim	which,	on	the	face	of	it,	is	‘odd’.3	Finally,	both	propositions	have	the	effect	of	obliterating	
arguably	 important	 differences	 between	 those	 criminologists	 who	 identified	 explicitly	 with	
different	 traditions	 like	 ‘social	 democracy’,	 ‘laborism’,	 ‘progressivism’,	 ‘social’	 (or	 ‘Keynesian)	
‘liberalism’	or	 ‘Fabian	socialism’	or	with	other	 less	progressive	 inclinations	 like	conservatism,	
fascism,	or	forms	of	proto	neo‐liberalism.		
	
Leaving	these	quibbles	aside,	what	does	Reiner	say	about	the	tradition’s	theory	of	knowledge?	
Mindful	of	the	need	to	avoid	creating	or	using	a	‘straw	man	version	of	positivism’,	Reiner	(2006:	
20)	 rather	 oddly	 claims	 that	 the	 social	 democratic	 tradition	was	 both	 ‘broadly	 positivist’	and	
cognisant	of	‘the	primacy	of	the	ethical’.	It	is	well	established	that	the	positivist	tradition	in	the	
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Anglophone	social	sciences	has	always	trusted	in	science,	insisted	on	keeping	‘values’	out	of	the	
research	 process	 and	 leaned	 towards	 the	 idea	 that	 ‘real’	 sciences	 ought	 to	 rely	 on	 a	 unitary	
‘scientific	method’	based	on	empirical	experience	as	the	only	valid	source	of	knowledge.	In	this	
vein	Reiner	claims	that:	
	
There	 can	 be	 no	 question	 that	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 was	 broadly	
‘positivist’	in	its	approach	to	social	science,	in	that	it	felt	it	important	to	research	
as	rigorously	as	possible	the	causes	of	crime	and	the	effectiveness,	humanity	and	
justice	of	crime	control	policies.	(Reiner	2006:	20)	
	
This	 presumably	 is	 why	 he	 insists	 that	 ‘They	 regarded	 it	 as	 useful	 to	 formulate	 and	 test	
empirical	generalizations’	(Reiner	2006:	11).	However	he	goes	on	to	add	that:		
	
Social	 democratic	 criminologists	 were	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 difficulties	 in	
conceptualizing	 crime,	 and	 did	 not	 simply	 take	 for	 granted	 the	 categories	 of	
criminal	law.	Legal	definitions	of	crime	embodied	power	rather	than	morality,	so	
they	inadequately	reflected	the	gravity	of	different	forms	of	anti‐social	or	harmful	
behaviour.	Social	democrats	viewed	routine	crime	as	harmful	and	problematic	‐
especially	to	the	most	vulnerable	in	society.	(Reiner	2006:	11)		
	
Reiner	seems	to	think	this	was	a	consequence	of	understanding	that	‘social	science	results	could	
[not]	be	regarded	as	…	completely	objective	representations	of	reality’	(Reiner	2006:	11)	–	even	
though	this	is	precisely	what	empirical	observations	are	supposed	to	supply.	Yet	Reiner	digs	the	
hole	he	is	already	in	deeper	when	he	then	allows	that:	‘There	are	of	course	enormous	problems	
in	interpreting	[sic]	recorded	trends	in	crime’	(Reiner	2006:	22)’.	The	difficulty,	as	Reiner	ought	
to	have	acknowledged,	 is	 less	 to	do	with	 ‘interpreting’	 and	more	 to	do	with	being	able	 to	 say	
anything	 ‘empirical’	about	 the	amount	of	 criminal	activity	because,	as	Garland	(2009:	18)	has	
said,	 crime	 is	 not	 ‘a	 self‐generated	 theoretical	 entity	 or	 a	 naturally‐occurring	 phenomenon’.	
Reiner	tacitly	concedes	Garland’s	point	when	he	says:	
	
It	 is	 impossible	 to	determine	with	 certainty	how	 far	 the	 [crime]	 statistics	 track	
changes	in	offending,	as	distinct	from	shifts	in	reporting	and	recording	practices	
by	victims	and	police,	and	alterations	in	counting	rules.	(Reiner	2006:	22)	
	
The	claim	that	‘criminology’	is	an	empirically	grounded,	broadly	positivist	enterprise	begins	to	
look	like	a	precarious	claim.		
	
Apart	from	that	difficulty,	Reiner	gets	into	a	different	kind	of	trouble	when	he	wants	to	add	an	
ethical	dimension	to	his	account.	He	has	already	insisted	that	social	democratic	criminology	was	
broadly	 positivist,	 because	 most	 ‘…	 accepted	 Weber’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 problems,	 limitations,	
ultimate	 impossibility	 and	 yet	 importance	 and	 desirability	 as	 an	 ideal	 of	 value‐freedom	 in	
science’.4	 Yet,	 even	 as	Reiner	 insists	 that	 criminology	was	 ‘broadly	positivist’,	 it	 seems	 it	 also	
aimed	 at,	 and	 ‘was	 derived	 from	 explicitly	 espoused	 ethical	 values’	 such	 as	 ‘the	 fundamental	
equality	of	value	of	individuals,	[or]	the	ancient	Golden	Rule	embodied	in	the	Biblical	injunction	
to	love	your	neighbour	as	yourself’	(2006:	12).	Given	there	is	general	agreement	(for	example,	
Goldthorpe	2007;	Oberschall	1987)	 that	 the	varieties	of	 ‘positivist’	Anglophone	 social	 science	
have	 rested	 their	 claims	 to	 intellectual	 authority	 on	 the	 claim	 that	 ‘real’	 science	 accesses	
empirical	experience	proceeds	by	keeping	‘values’	out	of	their	research,	this	proposition	may	be	
surprising	to	some.	Equally,	Reiner	seems	to	have	no	anxiety	about	claiming,	on	the	one	hand,	
that	there	 is	an	ethical	basis	 for	characterising	some	activities	as	 ‘harmful’	while,	on	the	other	
hand,	casually	advancing	the	structural‐functionalist	practice	of	‘reification’	involved	whenever	
claims	are	made	that	some	activities	are	‘anti‐social’,	a	proposition	clearly	aimed	at	implying	a	
descriptive,	even	objective,	status	while	actually	masking	‘value	preferences’.		
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Let	me	return	to	the	larger	picture.	It	seems	that,	while	many	practicing	criminologists	–	social	
democratic	or	otherwise	–	want	to	claim	that	theirs	is	an	‘empirical’,	even	‘scientific’,	practice,	if	
the	confusions	 I	have	pointed	 to	 in	Garland	and	Reiner	are	 typical,	 then	 there	may	be	a	good	
deal	of	confusion	about	what	this	means.		
	
Some	of	that	confusion	invokes	the	spectre	of	‘scientism’.	As	Kuhn	(1962)	and	Spencer	(1987)	
pointed	out,	an	ideology	of	‘scientism’	has	long	underpinned	the	‘modern’	account	of	‘scientific	
empiricism’.	‘Scientism’	is	the	ideology	which	holds	that	‘real	sciences’	ought	to,	or	actually	does,	
enact	a	‘dialectic	between	hypothesis	and	data’	(Spencer	1987:	335).5	In	criminology,	as	Turner	
(2013)	 has	 noted	 quite	 acutely,	 most	 working	 criminologists	 continue	 to	 operate	 as	 if	 this	
‘scientistic’	proposition	identified	by	Habermas	(1987:	4)	or	Latour	(1993)	is	true.	This	means	
conventional	physical	and	social	scientists	need	to	believe	that	their	practice	of	science:	
	
…	develops	observational	and	experimental	data,	and	then	tests	these	hypotheses	
through	 further	 observation	 and	 experimentation	…	 Science	 is	 then	 firmly	 and	
completely	 empirical,	 because	 belief	 is	 always	 grounded	 in	 data,	 and	 scientific	
beliefs	(hypotheses)	are	always	tentative	and	provisional	because	the	next	round	
of	observation	and	experiment	may	refute	them.	(Spencer	1987:	335)		
	
The	 modern	 subversion	 of	 this	 ‘scientism’	 began	 when	 Kuhn	 (1962)	 argued	 that	 practising	
scientists	 in	 the	physical	sciences	did	not	actually	work	this	way,	but	were	actually	 ‘imperfect	
empiricists’.	His	point	was	that	practising	scientists	did	not	treat	hypotheses	nominalistically	as	
provisional	propositions	to	be	tested,	but	treated	them	as	factual	claims	which	made	up	a	kind	
of	consensus‐based	cultural	framework	(or	‘paradigm’),	complete	with	an	agenda	of	agreed‐on	
questions	 and	 problems.6	 The	 resulting	 ‘paradigm’	 functioned	 as	 a	 shorthand	 account	 of	 the	
reality	of	‘what	the	world	is	like’.	Among	the	effects	was	a	profound	conservatism	on	the	part	of	
practising	‘scientists’,	allied	to	an	idea	that	the	‘science	of	the	day’	was	the	best	possible	account.	
Kuhn	used	this	to	explain	why	‘new’	science	(like	Copernican	cosmology	in	the	fifteenth	century	
or	Einsteinean	relativity	in	the	early	twentieth	century)	was	actively	resisted	by	scientists.	The	
primary	disjunction	between	‘scientific	empiricism’	which	Argyris	and	Schon	(1974)	would	call	
the	 ‘espoused	 theory’	 and	 ‘imperfect	 empiricism’	 (or	 the	 ‘theory	 in	 use’)	 is	 even	 more	
powerfully	evident	in	social	sciences	like	criminology.		
	
As	 Spencer	 (1987)	 indicates,	 modern	 social	 scientists	 may	 well	 want	 to	 don	 the	 mantle	 of	
‘scientific	empiricism’	while	in	fact	operating	as	‘imperfect	empiricists’.	In	practice,	Spencer	says	
this	means,	for	example,	that	they	rarely	if	ever	attempt	to	empirically	verify	the	efficacy	of	well‐
known,	tried	and	tested	techniques	or	to	replicate	‘empirical’	studies.7	If	there	is	any	attempt	to	
verify	 research	 results,	 this	 will	 yield	 inconclusive	 results	 because	 different	 researchers	 will	
interpret	these	results	differently.	As	for	the	‘empirical	evidence’,	the	canons	of	evidence	of	the	
relevant	 community	 of	 scholars	 define	 what	 is	 ‘social	 reality’,	 which	 requires	 that	 any	 raw	
observations	 or	 even	 experience	 cannot	 be	 treated	 as	 evidence	 until	 converted	 or	 translated	
into	the	conventionally‐defined	forms	that	quantitative	evidence	must	take.	Likewise	when	new	
‘theoretical’	frames	or	‘empirical	data’	is	presented,	practising	criminologists	will	tend	to	reject	
these	 new	 insights,	 especially	 if	 they	 contradict	 already	 settled	 convictions.	 Each	 of	 these	
circumstances	will,	 in	 turn,	be	 ignored	as	 criminologists	 continue	 to	 claim	 that	 ‘their’	work	 is	
scientific	and	secure	and	that	any	empirical	evidence	 to	 the	contrary	 is	 ‘spurious’.	As	Spencer	
insists,	the	reversal	of	the	putative	link	between	data	and	hypothesis	which	is	actually	at	work	
here	is	contrary	to	‘scientific	empiricist’	protocols.		
	
One	 of	 the	 basic	 difficulties	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 way	 ‘evidence’	 has	 been	 understood	 by	
empiricists.	 For	 example,	 as	 even	 AJ	 Ayer,	 an	 analytic	 philosopher	 famously	 dedicated	 to	
converting	philosophy	into	a	branch	of	positivist	science,	had	to	concede,	modern	discussions	of	
‘truth’,	‘fact’	or	‘evidence’	tend	at	best	to	be	circular,	and	at	worse	involve	the	conflation	of	these	
categories	in	ways	which	are	unhelpful	(Ayer	1963:	173).	Part	of	the	problem	involved	here	is	
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illuminated	 by	 etymological	 considerations	 which	 point	 to	 a	 tension	 between	 the	 idea	 of	
‘evidence’	 as	what	 becomes	 available	 to	 us	 courtesy	 of	 our	 sensory	 experience,	 and	what	we	
make	up	as	‘facts’	when	we	claim	to	know	things.	Our	oldest	conception	of	‘evidence’	(from	the	
Latin	vidi	=	to	see)	relies	on	the	sense	of	sight:	‘evidence’	is	what	we	can	see.	It	points	to	a	long	
tradition	of	 treating	what	 is	 available	 to	us,	 courtesy	of	 senses	 like	 sight,	 as	 the	 authoritative	
basis	for	grasping	the	truth.	Conversely,	the	idea	of	‘facts’	comes	to	us	from	the	Latin	(facere	=	to	
make).	This	gives	us	categories	like	the	factor	(or	worker)	who	labours	in	a	factory	and	the	idea	
of	 ‘fabrication’.	 Facts	 are	what	 we	 construct.	Worse,	 as	 any	 number	 of	modern	 philosophers	
from	Quine	(1974)	to	Putnam	(2002)	have	demonstrated,	the	tendency	to	treat	‘evidence’	as	a	
synonym	 for	 observable	 ‘facts’	 opens	 up	 deep	 problems.	 The	 positivist‐empiricist	 tradition	
attempt	 to	make	 ‘publicly	 observable’	 ‘physical	 objects’	 and	 ‘events’	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 defensible	
conception	of	 evidence,	 for	 example,	has	proved	 too	difficult	 to	 specify,	 let	 alone	defend.	And	
there’s	the	rub.	Because	the	lie	at	work	becomes	clear	if	we	consider	this:	if	criminologists	are	
indeed	working	as	‘scientific	empiricists’	claim	to	do,	this	would	require	them	to	specify,	among	
other	 things,	 the	 rational	 grounds	 of	 belief	 they	 have,	 along	 with	 the	 evidence	 they	 have	
‘discovered’	 which	 ostensibly	 support	 their	 knowledge	 claims.	 If	 indeed	 all,	 or	 even	 most,	
criminologists	are	also	working	as	‘scientific	empiricists’,	then	there	must	be	a	consensus	based	
on	 the	 rational	 principles	 of	 belief	 among	 these	members	 of	 the	 scientific	 community.	 For	 as	
Spencer	 notes	 with	memorable	 brutality,	 this	 must	 be	 so	 because	 ‘if	 these	 two	 principles	 of	
rational	 debate	 hold,	 then	disagreement	must	be	 impossible’	 (Spencer	 1987:	 367).	 That	 is,	 the	
combination	of	evidence,	the	sharing	of	the	same	rational	protocols	and	the	shared	principles	of	
interpretation,	 must	 result	 in	 a	 correct	 and	 consensual	 belief	 produced	 by	 rational	
argumentation.	This,	of	course,	is	the	embarrassing	absence	in	criminology.	
	
In	 short,	 as	 writers	 like	 Kuhn	 (1962),	 Polanyi	 (1966)	 and	 Spencer	 (1987)	 remind	 us,	 if	 we	
examine	the	actual	research	practices	of	physical	or	social	scientists,	we	find	that	that	they	do	
not	know	what	they	are	doing,	and	that	their	ignorance	of	this	’unpalatable	thesis’	has	serious	
consequences	for	the	progress	of	their	fields	(Spencer	1987:	331).8		
	
Recovering	a	lost	tradition:	The	role	of	fictions	
While	 any	 number	 of	 criminologists	 influenced	 by	 Foucault,	 Habermas,	 and	 Latour	 (like	
Garland,	Turner)	have	generated	a	range	of	constructivist,	poststructuralist,	and	post‐modernist	
critiques	of	the	‘scientism’	of	modern	criminology,	this	critical	deconstruction	has	not	proved	all	
that	 effective	 (Russell	 1997).	 Arguably	 at	 least	 one	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	 that	 much	 of	 this	
critique	 has	 been	 treated	 as	 ‘foreign’	 or	 ‘external’	 to	 the	 intellectual	 traditions	 from	 which	
Anglo‐American	criminology	has	emerged.		
	
No	such	excuse	 is	possible	for	the	 investigation	of	 the	role	played	by	 ‘fictions’	both	 in	the	 law	
and	in	every	other	domain	of	human	thought	and	action	instaurated	by	Jeremy	Bentham.	I	argue	
here	 that	 this	 ‘theory	 of	 fictions’	 has	much	 to	 offer	 to	modern	 criminology,	 if	 only	 because	 it	
helps	to	clarify	the	extent	to	which	its	underpinning	vocabulary	of	categories	is	either	genuinely	
empirical	or	else	‘fictitious’,	but	usefully	so	in	the	way	Bentham	first	demonstrated.		
	
My	‘positive‘	claim	is	this:	fictions	play	a	central	yet	little	understood	role	in	the	field	of	modern	
‘criminology’.	I	begin	by	tracing	out	the	long‐forgotten	work	of	Jeremy	Bentham	who	elaborated	
a	 complex	 and	 interesting	 theory	 of	 fictions	 which	 belies	 his	 by‐now	 mythic	 status	 as	 the	
founder	of	‘legal	positivism’	and	an	excoriating	critic	of	‘legal	fictions’.	I	then	adumbrate	some	of	
the	 implications	 of	 this	 theory	 of	 fictions	 (Fuller	 1967;	 Vaihinger	 1935)	 for	 criminology.	 The	
point	 is	 simple:	 the	development	of	 a	 sophisticated	 theory	 of	 fictions	 initiated	by	Bentham	 is	
simply	 too	 important	 to	 be	 left	 to	 a	 few	 legal	 studies	 scholars.	 Contemporary	 research	 in	
criminology	 needs	 to	 rehabilitate	 the	 proper	 role	 played	 by	 fictions	 as	 they	 grapple	with	 the	
‘wicked	problems’	that	currently	populate	this	field.		
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The	role	of	fictions	has	yet	to	be	given	its	proper	due	in	mainstream	criminology.	This	is	odd.	As	
British	 criminologist	 Pat	 Carlen	 (2010:	 122)	 argues,	 the	 vast	 array	 of	 legal	 and	other	 fictions	
raises	large	and	difficult	questions	about	the	‘knowledge’	and	principles	which	those	academics,	
officials,	 policy‐makers,	 judges	 and	police	who	make	up	 a	 ‘criminal	 justice	 system’,	 are	 either	
busily	fabricating	or	relying	on.	This	may	seem	odd	for	those	who	believe,	naively	perhaps,	that	
‘the	law’	or	modern	criminal	justice	systems	have	a	robust	and	uncomplicated	regard	for	getting	
at	 ‘the	 facts’.	 Just	 how	 complicated	 and	 complicating	 is	 suggested	 initially	 when	 we	 briefly	
consider	 Jeremy	 Bentham’s	 well‐known	 opposition	 to	 ‘legal	 fictions’,	 and	 his	 much	 more	
interesting	account	of	the	role	of	fictions	in	social	life.		
	
Anglo‐American	 legal	 systems	 are	 conventionally	 understood	 to	 be	 preoccupied	 with	
establishing	the	facts	and	assigning	responsibility	for	wrongs	and	remedies	on	the	basis	of	those	
facts.	 Yet	 as	many	modern	 philosophers	 of	 the	 law	 like	 de	 Champs	 (1999),	 Polloczek	 (1999)	
Stolzenberg	(1999),	Schofield	(2006:	1‐27),	Quinn	(2011),	Schauer	(2011)	and	Knauer	(2010)	
have	noticed,	Anglophone	 legal	 systems	are	 actually	 filled	with	 legal	 fictions.	While	 these	 are	
difficult	to	define	in	their	generality,	a	narrow	‘procedural’	definition	of	a	legal	fiction	involves	‘a	
false	 allegation	 of	 fact	 employed	 to	 enlarge	 jurisdiction	 or	 to	 extend	 substantive	 remedies’	
usually	to	avoid	changing	an	existing	body	of	law	or	rules	(Harmon	1991:	2).	Among	the	many	
modern	 examples	 are	 the	 way	 tax	 law	 treats	 companies	 as	 if	 they	 are	 individuals,	 or	 the	
‘attractive	nuisance’	doctrine	in	US	tort	law	(for	the	latter,	see	Ohio	Supreme	Court	2001).		
	
Bentham	 (1943	 i:	 59)	 is	 conventionally	 understood	 to	 have	 treated	 these	 legal	 fictions	 as	 a	
symptom	of	everyth++++++ing	wrong	about	English	law.	Bentham	understood	by	the	idea	of	a	
legal	fiction	‘	…	a	false	assertion	of	a	privileged	kind	…	which	though	acknowledged	to	be	false,	is	
at	 the	 same	 time	 argued	 from	 and	 acted	 upon	 as	 if	 true’	 (Bentham	1843	 ix:	 77).	 Bentham	 is	
conventionally	represented	as	the	greatest	scourge	of	English	common	law	and	its	reliance	on	
the	‘pernicious	fictions’	generated	by	jurists	like	Blackstone.	As	Stolzenberg	(1999:	226)	notes,	
Bentham’s	 contempt	 for	 legal	 fictions	 ‘bordered	 on	 an	 obsession’	 and	 lead	 him	 to	 express	
himself	 repeatedly,	 and	 splenetically,	 on	 the	 topic:	 ‘In	 English	 law,	 fiction	 is	 a	 syphilis,	which	
runs	 in	 every	 vein,	 and	 carries	 into	 every	 part	 of	 the	 system	 the	 principle	 of	 rottenness’	
(Bentham,	 in	 Fuller	 1967:	 2‐3).	 It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 for	 much	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	
Bentham	was	remembered	as	the	great	‘legal	positivist’	who	battled	the	plague	of	legal	fictions,	
as	part	of	his	program	of	rational	legal	and	social	reform.		
	
However,	 as	 recent	 scholarship	 has	 demonstrated,	 Bentham’s	 actual	 position	 on	 fictions	 is	
infinitely	more	 complex	 –	 and	 challenging	 (de	 Champs	 1999;	 Fine	1993;	 Lee	1990;	 Polloczek	
1999;	Quinn	2011;	 	Schofield	2006:	1‐27;	Stolzenberg	1999).	Reflecting	the	revival	of	rhetoric	
and	the	development	of	critical	legal	studies	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	scholars	like	Fish	(1972),	
Patey	 (1984),	 Eden	 (1986),	 Brann	 (1991),	Welsh	 (1992),	 Schauer	 (2011)	 and	Knauer	 (2010)	
have	demonstrated	that	Bentham’s	actual	position	on	the	role	of	fictions	in	language	relied	on	a	
highly	 sophisticated	 engagement	 with	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	 century	 linguistic	 theory	
developed	 inter	alia	by	Descartes,	 Pascal,	 Locke,	Harris,	 Priestley	 and,	 especially,	 Tooke.	 That	
engagement	 lead	Bentham	 ‘to	 see	 discourse	 as	 the	necessary	 symbolic	 foundation	 of	 another	
symbolic	system:	that	of	power	relationships	within	society’	(de	Champs	1999:	28).	Like	Ogden	
(1932),	 Stolzenberg	 (1999)	 and	 Schofield	 (2006)	 demonstrate	 that	 Bentham	 understood	 the	
role	and	value	of	fictions,	locating	them	within	a	complex	account	of	human	language	in	which	
fictions	make	possible	human	cognition,	 judgement	and	action.	 It	 is	not	possible	here	 to	 fully	
survey	 the	 scale	 or	 sophistication	 of	 Bentham’s	 theory	 of	 fictions,	 so	 I	 simply	 amalgamate	
Bentham’s	account	with	that	of	Vaihinger	(1935).		
	
As	Stolzenberg	(1999)	argues,	Bentham’s	account	of	fictions	appears	to	condemn	legal	fictions	
based	on	a	simple	opposition	of	 ‘fact’	to	 ‘fiction’.	Yet	this	is	plainly	not	what	Bentham	thought.	
Bentham	had	a	complex	understanding	of	the	relationship	of	truth	to	fiction	which	treats	fiction	
as	 an	 indispensable	 feature	 of	 language,	 reflecting	 a	 belief	 ‘that	 a	 language	 which	 only	
Rob	Watts:	On	Fiction	and	Wicked	Problems	
	
IJCJ&SD					123	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(n)	
“mirrored”	 reality	 would	 be	 impossible’.	 By	 ‘real’,	 Bentham	 simply	 meant	 that	 there	 were	
physical	 things	or	 realia	 available	 to	us	via	 sensory	perceptions	on	which	we	 then	arbitrarily	
confer	 names.	 To	 use	 the	 vocabulary	 of	 modern	 philosophy,	 Bentham	 rejected	 a	
‘correspondence’	theory	of	 truth’.	Rather,	Bentham	spoke	 ‘often	and	approvingly	of	 fictions	as	
an	 essential	 and	 constitutive	 feature	 of	 all	 human	 language	 and	 thought’	 (Stolsenberg	 1999:	
128).	As	Bentham	put	it:	‘To	language,	then	–	to	language	alone	–	it	is,	that	fictitious	entities	owe	
their	existence;	their	impossible	yet	indispensable	existence’	(cited	Ogden	1934:	15).	Or,	as	he	
put	it	elsewhere:	‘Of	nothing	…	that	has	place,	or	passes	in	our	mind,	can	we	speak	(or	so	much	
as	think)	otherwise	than	in	the	way	of	fiction’	(Bentham	1843	vii:	199).	As	Ogden	(1934:	1)	put	
it:	 ‘Bentham	 believed	 that	 language	must	 contain	 fictions	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 a	 language’.	 As	
Quinn	(2011)	indicates,	Bentham’s	position	assumes:	
	
…	 a	 fundamental	 linguistic	 distinction	 between	 names	which	 have	 referents	 in	
the	 world,	 and	 names	 which	 have	 no	 such	 referents,	 reflecting	 an	 ontological	
distinction	 between	 things	which	 exist,	 and	 things	which	 do	 not.	 [However]	 …	
whilst	the	world	really	exists,	the	names	‘reality’	and	‘existence’	are,	for	Bentham,	
names	of	fictitious	entities	…	One	solution	to	the	paradox	is	to	accept	the	reality	
of	both	substances	and	sensations,	and	to	hope	that,	for	the	most	part,	there	will	
be	 a	 correspondence	 between	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 external	 world	 and	 our	
perception	 of	 it,	 and	 this	 appears	 to	 be	 Bentham’s	 preferred	 solution.	 (Quinn	
2011:	4‐7)	
	
That	Bentham’s	theory	of	fictions	failed	to	exercise	the	kind	of	 influence	that	might	have	been	
expected	since	his	death	is	both	odd	and	raises	important	issues	for	the	history	of	ideas.	Suffice	
it	 to	 say	 the	 novelty	 and	 reach	 of	 Bentham’s	 actual	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 of	 fictions	was	
neither	fully	grasped	nor	recognised	until	the	1930s,	before	again	disappearing	and	then	being	
remembered	again	 in	 the	 late	1980s.	 It	 is	 certainly	puzzling	 that	while	Ogden	 (1932)	 tried	 to	
rehabilitate	 Bentham’s	 achievement,	 Fuller	 (1967),	 a	 great	 modern	 legal	 scholar,	 dealt	
definitively	with	a	theory	of	legal	fictions	in	a	way	that	paralleled	Bentham’s	theory	of	fictions	–	
whilst	 denying	 to	 Bentham	 any	 credit	 for	 doing	 so	 (Stolzenberg	 1999)!	 Finally	 and	 no	 less	
puzzling,	 the	 most	 significant	 ‘modern’	 contribution	 to	 thinking	 about	 fictions	 was	 made	 by	
Hans	Vaihinger	and	that,	as	Ogden	(1934:	v)	noted,	Vaihinger’s	developed	his	general	theory	of	
fictions	 without	 any	 awareness	 of	 Bentham’s	 theory	 of	 fictions	 which	 it	 both	 shadowed	 and	
elaborated.	
	
In	1877,	Vaihinger	began	a	project	 to	demonstrate	 the	 role	 that	 fictions,	 both	as	 concept	 (for	
example,	 ‘atom’	or	 ‘justice’)	 and	 as	propositions	 (for	 example,	 ‘all	men	are	motivated	only	by	
self‐interest’),	play	both	in	human	affairs	and	in	all	the	‘sciences’	(Vaihinger	1935).	Vaihinger’s	
work	 exemplifies	 a	 general	 turn	 by	 contemporary	 philosophers	 (for	 example,	 Peirce,	
Wittgenstein,	Richards,	Ayer,	Austin,	Popper,	Winch)	to	acknowledge	the	special	role	played	by	
language	 and	 other	 symbolic	 systems	 in	 an	 account	 of	 human	 thought	 and	 action	 which	
emphasised	 the	 human	 and/or	 social	 character	 of	 knowledge	 as	 an	 historically	 evolving	
practice.	It	effectively	rejected	the	oldest	western	tradition	inaugurated	by	Plato	committed	to	
identifying	 the	 criteria	 by	which	 ‘truth’	 could	 be	 known.	 ‘Truth’	 was	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	
eternal,	 universal,	 even	 law‐like	 propositions	 deduced	 by	 logical	 reasoning,	 deploying	
essentialist	 concepts,	 and	 searching	 for	 fundamental	 foundations	 which	 could	 establish	 a	
timeless	correspondence	between	what	we	know	and	a	reality	no	less	immutable	and	timeless	
(Toulmin	 1972:	 16‐25).	 For	 the	 longest	 time,	 this	 tradition	 involved	 treating	 the	 mind	 (and	
philosophy)	as	 ‘the	mirror	of	nature’	(Rorty	1979).	The	result	was	an	integrated	philosophical	
and	‘scientific’	project	based	on	the	arbitrary	assertion	that	human	rationality	relied	on	certain	
rules	and	a	vocabulary	given	to	us	by	Aristotelian	logic	and	by	Euclidean	geometry	which	in	turn	
secured	a	foundation	of	fixed	and	eternally	true	modes	of	reasoning.		
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Like	Bentham,	Vaihinger	allows	that	we	rely	on	both	‘facts’	and	‘fictions’.	Facts	come	to	us	from	
the	‘real’	or	‘actual’	world	as	sensations	which	‘press	more	or	less	forcibly	upon	us	with	greater	
or	 less	 irresistibility,	and	both	come	from	within	our	body	as	well	as	are	 impressed	upon	our	
body’	(Vaihinger	1935:	xlvii)	(For	the	relevant	critique	of	this	and	the	reframing	of	‘fictions’	as	a	
product	 of	 a	 ‘social	 imaginary’,	 see	 Castoriadis	 1997:	 322‐4).	 Vaihinger	 (1935:	 167)	 thought,	
while	these	‘facts’	(or	sensations	of	real	objects	and	phenomena)	were	the	proper	objects	of	any	
science,	 they	 were	 not	 enough:	 we	 also	 need	 fictions.	 By	 ‘fiction’	 Vaihinger	 means	 simply	
something	that	is	assumed	to	exist	or	to	be	true	when	it	is	known	not	to	exist	or	to	be	true.	That	
is:	
	
	…	 many	 thought‐processes	 and	 thought‐constructs	 appear	 to	 be	 consciously	
false	 assumptions,	 which	 either	 contradict	 reality	 or	 are	 even	 contradictory	 in	
themselves	 but	 which	 are	 intentionally	 thus	 formed	 in	 order	 to	 overcome	
difficulties	of	thought	by	this	artificial	deviation.	(Vaihinger	1935:	xlvi‐xlvii)		
	
These	 fictions	play	a	vital,	 even	 indispensable,	 role	 in	all	domains	of	human	 life	 including	 the	
sciences	 both	 ‘hard’	 –	 like	 physics,	 chemistry,	 biology	 and	 mathematics	 –	 and	 ‘soft’	 –	 like	
economics,	sociology,	psychology,	political	theory,	philosophy	and	theology.	They	are	found,	too,	
in	religion	and	in	ethical	and	aesthetic	judgements,	as	well	as	the	regulation	of	communities	by	
legal	and	political	means.	We	use	fictions,	for	example,	to	rework	or	make	sense	of	the	‘facts	of	
science’	 as	well	 as	 address	 questions	 of	meaning	 (for	 example,	 by	way	 of	myth,	 religion	 and	
aesthetic	 activity)	 or	 help	 us	 order	 our	 social	 life	 (for	 example,	 ethical	 and	 politico‐legal	
practice).	 They	 are	 justifiable	 to	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	 prove	 useful	 in	 solving	 an	 array	 of	
human	problems	or	meeting	our	needs.	
	
Because	 fictions	play	a	huge	variety	of	 roles	 in	all	human	 thought	and	action,	 their	scope	and	
role	 is	 legion.	 How	 reliant	 we	 are	 on	 fictions	 is	 suggested	 in	 Vaihinger’s	 account	 of	 fictions	
which	formalises	Bentham’s	earlier	typology.	They	include:		
	
 Artificial	 classification,	 for	 example,	 biological	 classifications	 which	 are	 reliant	 on	
fictional	categories	like	‘species’	or	‘genera’.		
 Abstractive	fictions	which	explain	some	large	problem	or	phenomenon	by	leaving	out	a	
lot	 of	 messy	 detail.	 Economists,	 for	 example,	 rely	 on	 a	 ‘rational	 actor’	 model	 which	
insists	 all	 human	 action	 is	 rational	 and	 selfish	 and	 then	 use	 this	 to	 construe	 the	
behaviour	of	markets	or	even	whole	societies.		
 Type	 fictions	 include	Weberian	 ideal‐types	 like	 ‘bureaucracy’,	 ‘populism’	or	 ‘traditional	
authority’.	
 Analogical	or	metaphoric	fictions	use	analogy	to	make	sense	of	one	thing	in	terms	of	the	
characteristics	 of	 another.	Metaphors	 are	 the	most	 obvious	 and	widespread	 example.	
Lakoff	and	Johnson	(1980)	argue	for	the	‘metaphor	metaphor’,	claiming	that	all	human	
thought	and	language	use	is	essentially	metaphoric.	For	example,	the	idea	that	Jean	is	a	
‘member	of	society’	points	to	the	metaphor	of	‘society	as	body’	as	much	as	the	idea	that	
Bill	is	the	‘head’	of	the	family.	
 Legal	or	juristic	fictions	include	the	‘attractive	nuisance’	rule	in	US	tort	law.	
 Practical	or	ethical	fictions	include	an	array	of	categories	like	‘freedom’,	‘liberty’,	‘justice’,	
‘the	good’,	‘human	rights’,	the	‘moral	law’	and	so	on.	
 Mathematical	 fictions	 include	 fundamental	 concepts	 like	 ‘point’,	 ‘line’,	 ‘circle’,	 ‘triangle’	
‘number’	‘lines	without	breadth’,	‘empty	space’,	‘empty	time’	as	well	as	propositions	like	
‘a	line	is	a	series	of	points’.	This	treatment	of	algebra,	arithmetic	and	geometry	stresses	
that	 these	 are	 entirely	 fictional	 enterprises	 and	 have	 been	 knowingly	 constructed	 on	
that	 basis	 from	 their	 very	 origins.	 (This	 point	 is	 insisted	 on	 in	 a	 recent	 and	 beautiful	
introduction	by	Lockhart	(2012:	1‐2)).	As	Vaihinger	(1935:	57)	put	it:	‘Mathematics,	as	a	
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whole,	 constitutes	 the	 classical	 instance	 of	 an	 ingenious	 instrument,	 or	 a	 mental	
expedient	for	facilitating	the	operation	of	thought’.	
	
The	 Bentham‐Vaihinger	 account	 of	 fictions	 relies	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 the	 value	 of	 our	
knowledge	claims	are	best	judged	in	terms	of	how	well	our	‘knowledge’	confers	on	us	a	capacity	
to	successfully	engage	the	world	–	or	not.	Accordingly	the	proper	test	of	the:	
	
…	correctness	of	a	 logical	process	 lies	 in	practice,	and	the	purpose	of	thought	is	
not	proved	by	the	adequacy	of	the	reflection	of	a	so‐called	‘objective’	world,	but	
in	 rendering	 possible	 the	 calculation	 of	 events	 and	 of	 operations	 upon	 them.	
(Vaihinger	1935:	5)		
	
The	 implication	 is	 that	we	need	to	 think	about	 the	value	of	our	knowledge	not	 in	 terms	of	 its	
correspondence	 with	 the	 world	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 capacity	 to	 help	 us	 live	 in	 the	 world	
successfully.		
	
Neither	Bentham	nor	Vaihinger	allowed	for	the	possibility	that	our	fictions,	like	the	larger	belief	
systems	 they	help	 to	 constitute,	 are	 symbolic	 expressions	of	political	 and	 cultural	patterns	of	
power	or	what	Bourdieu	(2003:	43‐65)	represented	as	unequal	forms	of	symbolic	capital.	Both	
Bentham	and	Vaihinger	also	begged	the	question	of	how	we	can	ever	know	or	test	our	fictions	in	
ways	 which	 evade	 the	 problem	 of	 ‘cognitive	 dissonance’,	 the	 well‐documented	 psychological	
disposition	 to	 only	 ever	 accept	 evidence	 that	 confirms	 our	 existing	 beliefs	 and	 to	 reject	 any	
evidence	that	threatens	our	belief	systems	(Festinger	et	al.	1956).	
	
Implications	for	criminology	
The	 recovery	 of	 this	 theory	 of	 fictions	 is	 pertinent,	 especially	 for	 those	 concerned	 by	 the	
continuing	 influence	 of	 conventional	 criminology	 which	 Tauri	 (2013:	 220‐2)	 aptly	 calls	
‘authoritarian	 criminology’.	 Tauri	 (2013:	 210)	 characterises	modern	 criminology	 as	 a	way	 of	
thinking	about	the	world	which	is	at	once	 ‘administrative’	and	 ‘authoritarian’,	which	claims	to	
know	our	world	by	clothing	itself	in	a	‘veil	of	scientism’	by	claiming	‘scientific	empiricist’	status	
to	assist	 in	both	 the	 ‘discovery’	of	 crime	and	 its	evaluation	of	what	works	–	or	doesn’t.	These	
claims	 privilege	 the	 way	 ‘criminology’	 then	 proceeds	 to	 address	 the	 definition	 and	
conceptualisation	of	crime	as	defined	by	the	state,	as	well	as	 legitimate	its	preoccupation	with	
certain	‘problem	populations’	like	Indigenous	and	working‐class	young	people.	The	recovery	of	
the	role	played	by	fictions	may	help	lift	the	‘veil	of	scientism’.		
	
The	point	is	not	to	insist	that	criminology	confine	itself	only	to	what	is	genuinely	empirical.	As	
this	account	of	 fictions	suggests,	any	attempt	to	confine	criminology	 to	only	making	empirical	
claims	would	produce	an	impossibly	narrow,	even	irrelevant,	enterprise.	In	many	cases	there	is	
no	empirical	basis	that	can	be	used	to	resolve	the	problem	of	who	or	what	constitutes	an	array	
of	crimes	let	alone	determine	on	what	empirical	basis	‘it’	can	be	counted.	It	all	depends	rather	
on	what	we	want	our	categories	to	signify	and	why	we	want	it	to	mean	‘this’	or	‘that’:	we	need	
only	to	be	clear	what	practical	purposes	we	wish	to	achieve.	This	requires	that	those	engaging	
in	this	process	are	reflexively	aware	of	the	way	the	fictions	are	working	and	whether	this	leads	
to	good	practice	or	a	policy	worth	having.		
	
On	fictions,	wicked	problems	and	phronesis	
It	is	in	this	respect	that	a	critical	criminology	project	needs	to	understand	the	proper	role	played	
by	 fictions:	 they	help	us	when	 they	are	being	used	consciously	and	 fruitfully	 to	pursue	better	
solutions	 to	 the	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 we	 face.	 For	 if	 the	 theory	 of	 fictions	 has	 been	 too	 long	
repressed,	 so	 too	 has	 the	 significance	 of	 Rittel	 and	 Webber’s	 (1973)	 account	 of	 ‘wicked	
problems’.	The	entire	field	of	criminal	justice	is	best	thought	of	as	a	field	of	‘wicked	problems’.	
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Rittel	and	Webber’s	(1973)	paper	is	arguably	one	of	the	most	important	and	subversive	social	
scientific	papers	ever	published.	Perhaps	 for	 that	 reason	 it	has	been	systematically	 repressed	
and/or	misunderstood.	It	offers	nothing	less	than	a	unifying	account	of	the	conjoint	ontological	
and	epistemological	features	of	those	social	problems	which	humans	in	general,	and	politicians	
and	policy‐makers	in	particular,	confront.	It	is	to	be	noted	that	the	term	‘wicked’	is	used	not	to	
denote	 some	 sense	 that	 we	 face	 ‘evil’	 problems	 so	 much	 as	 to	 designate	 their	 resistance	 to	
resolution.	
	
We	can	characterise	wicked	problems	best	by	comparing	them	with	‘tame	problems’	and	‘tame	
solutions’.	Tame	problems	are,	on	the	one	hand,	any	problems	found	typically	in	formal	systems	
(like	algebra	or	geometry),	in	games	bound	by	clear	rules	(like	chess)	or	by	essentially	technical	
problems	 like	 ‘what	 engineering	 features	 will	 enable	 a	 bridge	 to	 carry	 40	 ton	 trucks’.	 Tame	
problems	 involve	 conceptual	 entities	 which	 enable	 narrow	 and	 specific	 definitions,	 either	
because	they	possess	formal	axiological	properties	(like	all	mathematical	systems	or	games)	or	
because	 they	 are	 amenable	 to	 precise	 empirical	 description.	 Tame	 problems	 have	 tame	
solutions.	This	means	there	are	solutions	which	involve	‘true’/	‘false	or	‘yes’/’no’	answers:	there	
are	 always	 correct	 answers	 to	 well‐defined	 problems	 rendered	 possible	 by	 laws,	 logical	
processes	or	even	algorithmic	procedures.		
	
Wicked	problems,	on	the	other	hand,	are	all	of	the	other	kinds	of	problems	we	humans	face	as	
we	struggle	to	order	our	lives	and	world:	they	have	their	origin	in	and	resolution	in	fictions	and	
are	 irreducibly	 practical,	 ethical	 and/or	 political	 in	 nature.	 Wicked	 problems	 are	 by	 nature	
ineffable	since	we	cannot	even	get	an	agreed‐on	definition	of	what	the	problem	is.	To	begin	at	the	
beginning,	there	is	no	definitive	formulation	of	a	wicked	problem:	defining	wicked	problems	is	
itself	 a	wicked	 problem.	 That	 problem	may	 be	 represented	 as	 the	 problem	 of	 ‘social	 justice’,	
‘poverty’,	‘unemployment’	or,	in	the	case	discussed	here,	of	‘recidivism’.	(Add	in	other	categories	
like	‘drug	use’,	‘delinquency’,	‘white	collar	crime’	or	‘graffiti’	and	the	scale	of	this	issue	becomes	
apparent).	The	seduction	of	the	idea	promoted	by	various	communities	of	positivists	since	the	
early	 nineteenth	 century,	 that	 we	 treat	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 as	 if	 they	 are	 ‘tame	 problems’	
amenable	 to	 technical,	 statistical	 or	 axiological	 solutions,	 has	 caused	 no	 end	 of	 trouble	 and	
confusion.		
	
Think,	for	example,	of	the	problem	of	adolescent	crime.	The	actual	problem	of	juvenile	offending	
is	the	every	instance	of	what	has	happened	when	Johnny	stole	a	car,	or	Sara	shoplifted	a	dress.	
To	represent	the	problem	as	the	one	revealed	by	statistics	pointing	to	a	juvenile	shoplifting	rate	
of,	say,	2516	per	100,000	of	people	aged	15‐25,	 is	 to	have	shifted	away	from	recognising	that	
Johnny	or	Sara	are	presenting	us	with	a	wicked	problem,	and	to	tempt	us	with	the	idea	that	we	
have	here	a	tame	problem,	a	rising	rate	of	juvenile	offending	requiring	a	technical	fix.	Johnny	or	
Sara	 present	 the	 various	 professional	 police,	 lawyers,	 youth	 workers	 or	 magistrates	 with	 a	
practical	question:	What	should	we	do	with	Johnny	or	Sara?	That	question	will	be	addressed	by	
a	combination	of	soundings	based	on	the	relevant	laws,	the	state	of	the	resources	available	to	
the	 various	 players	 and	 their	 organisations	 that	 interact	 with	 Johnny	 or	 Sara.	 In	 thinking	
through	what	to	do	with	 Johnny	or	Sara,	we	see	the	salience	of	 the	general	account	of	wicked	
problems	offered	by	Rittel	and	Webber.	We	may	not	even	be	able	to	define	the	problem.	Johnny	
or	Sara	may	or	may	not	have	stolen	a	car	or	clothing	for	the	obvious	reasons.	It	may	have	been	a	
first	off	incident	or	part	of	a	long	pattern	and	so	forth.		
	
Wicked	problems	do	not	have	solutions	that	are	true	or	false,	only	solutions	that	are	better	or	
worse.	Do	we	throw	the	book	at	Johnny	or	Sara	or	let	them	off	with	a	stern	talking	to?	Solutions	
to	wicked	 problems	 are	 not	 right	 or	wrong.	 There	 is	 no	 immediate	 and	 no	 ultimate	 test	 of	 a	
solution	to	a	wicked	problem.	Often	the	problem	is	not	understood	until	after	the	formulation	of	
a	 solution.	Every	wicked	problem	 is	 essentially	 novel	 and	unique.	Every	 solution	 to	 a	wicked	
problem	 is	 a	 'one	 shot’	 operation.	 Wicked	 problems	 have	 no	 given	 alternative	 solutions.	 In	
almost	every	case	a	wicked	problem	requires	a	form	of	practice,	a	practical	intervention	guided	
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not	by	a	 theorem	or	an	axiom	but	by	what	Sharpe	and	Schwartz	(2010)	have	called	 ’practical	
wisdom’	or	what	Flyvbjerg	et	al.	(2012)	called	‘phronetic	social	science’.		
	
Though	 they	seem	not	 to	have	been	conscious	of	 it,	Rittel	and	Webber	 (1973)	were,	 in	effect,	
making	 the	 same	 point	 made	 by	 Aristotle	 when	 he	 distinguished	 between	 the	 alignment	 of	
episteme	with	theoria	as	the	appropriate	kind	of	science	to	know	the	physis	of	the	natural	world	
on	 the	one	hand	and,	 on	 the	other,	 the	 role	 of	phronesis	 (or	 practical	wisdom)	as	 the	 kind	of	
knowledge	we	need	to	work	out	what	kind	of	praxis	we	ought	to	engage	in	order	to	solve	the	
practical	 or	wicked	 problems	 communities	 and	 people	 encounter.	 Both	 Sharpe	 and	 Schwartz	
(2010)	 and	 Flyvbjerg	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 have	 argued	 persuasively	 for	 a	 major	 rethink	 about	 the	
relationships	between	different	kinds	of	knowledge	and	our	practical	attempts	to	solve	wicked	
problems.	That	case	needs	to	be	taken	seriously	by	academics	and	practitioners	working	in	the	
field	 of	 ‘modern	 criminology’	 as	 I	 have	 defined	 it	 broadly	 here	 and	 by	 those	 interested	 in	
developing	a	critical	youth	studies.	That	rethink	will	begin	by	taking	the	Benthamic	account	of	
fictions	seriously,	as	a	prelude	to	re‐imagining	problems	addressed	by	criminologists	as	a	field	
beset	 by	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 urgently	 needing	 the	 application	 of	 practical	 wisdom.	 For	 social	
democratic	 criminologists,	 that	 also	 involves	 spelling	 out	 the	 relevant	 human	 goods	 which	
defensible	kinds	of	justice	policy	ought	to	properly	identify	–	and	promote.	
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1		Though	this	can	only	be	pointed	to	in	an	extremely	schematic	way	here,	the	larger	reflexive	project	of	which	this	
paper	 is	 just	 one	part,	 assumes	 that	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 criminology	whether	 in	 its	 conventional	 form	and/or	 as	 a	
social	democratic	project,	will	rely	on	the	success	with	which	its	proponents	clarify	and	defend	their	practices	and	
assumptions	across	 three	dimensions.	Firstly	 it	will	need	 to	provide	persuasively	 reasoned	accounts	of	what	 the	
nature	of	the	‘stuff’	is	that	it	examines;	secondly	how	it	secures	credible	knowledge	claims;	and	thirdly	and	above	all	
else,	how	it	secures	its	‘practical’	(that	is,	ethical)	value	and	efficacy.	This	refers	in	short	respectively	to	the	clarity	
and	credibility	of	the	kinds	of	ontological,	epistemological	and	practical	(that	is,	ethical)	reasoning	which	are	made	
available.	 My	 assumption	 here	 is	 that	 a	 social	 democratic	 criminology	 will	 need	 to	 distance	 itself	 from	 the	
characteristic	ways	mainstream	criminology	understands	or	addresses	these	matters.	Again	schematically	I	would	
propose	 that	 a	 social	 democratic	 project	 would	 need	 to	 distance	 itself	 from	 conventional	 criminology	 while	
constructing	a	carefully	crafted	synopsis	which	drew	minimally	on	the	work	of	four	writers,	namely	Finnis	(1980),	
Castoriadis	(1998),	Habermas	(2004)	and	Dworkin	(2011),	who,	differences	notwithstanding,	provide	the	basis	for	
such	a	reasoned	framework.	
2		Problems	 akin	 to	 Garland’s	 are	 emulated	 frequently.	 For	 example	 Cooper	 and	 Worrall	 (2012:390)	 claim	 that	
criminological	 ‘theory’	 involves	 ‘offering	 explanations	 couched	 in	 terms	 of	 cause	 and	 effect’,	 even	 as	 they	
acknowledge	that	there	is	‘no	consensus	about	what	crime	is,	or	how	it	should	be	defined,	let	alone	consensus	on	
theorizing	criminal	behaviour’	(2012:	387).	Young’s	(1987:	357)	advocacy	for	a	‘realist	criminology’	proposes	that	
criminologists	be	‘faithful	to	the	phenomenon	it	is	studying’	while	avoiding	conflating	realism	with	empiricism:	this,	
says	Young,	 is	because	a	realist	criminology	will	 ‘not	merely	 reflect	 the	world	of	appearances’	which	 is	precisely	
what	 empiricism	 is	 committed	 to	 doing.	 Other	 realists	 like	 Mathews	 (1987:	 371)	 were	 insisting	 that	 ‘realist	
criminology’	 promotes	 ‘a	 commitment	 to	 detailed	 empirical	 investigation’	 and	 stressing	 ‘the	 independence	 and	
objectivity	 of	 criminal	 activity’.	 Mathews’	 subsequent	 defence	 of	 realism	 is	 qualified	 to	 the	 point	 of	 terminal	
confusion	when	he	allows	that	crime	is	‘historically	variable’	but	is	‘real’	because	it	is	the	product	of	what	he	calls	
‘material	 relations’	 which	 allows	 him	 then	 to	 excoriate	 commentators	 like	 Hulsman	 (1986:	 71),	 when	 Hulsman	
argued	that	‘crime	has	no	ontological	reality’.	
3		Among	 many	 considerations	 Reiner	 would	 need	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 well	 known	 structural‐functionalist	
defence	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 inequality	 as	 socially	 functional	 was	 explicitly	 rejected	 by	 Merton	 on	 ‘social	
democratic’	grounds.	
4		Since	Weber,	the	underpinnings	of	value	freedom	have	been	severely	undermined.	For	one	thing	the	very	sensuous	
perception	of	the	empirical	world	(as	‘observation’	of	 ‘experience’)	has	turned	out	to	be	itself	a	theory	–	or	value‐
laden	process	(Barnes	et	al.	1996).	 It	 is	now	generally	recognised	that	 there	 is	no	dichotomy	between	 ‘facts’	and	
‘values’	and	hence	statements	cannot	be	readily	classified	as	belonging	to	one	or	the	other	category	(Machamer	and	
Wolters	2004;	Putnam	2002).	
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5		This	 proposition	 is	 then	 welded	 to	 another	 claim	 that	 proper	 knowledge	 or	 ‘truth’	 conforms	 to	 the	 originating	
Aristotelian	 conception	 of	 episteme‐as‐scientific	 knowledge	 which	 is	 timeless,	 objective,	 scientific,	 predictive	 and	
generates	value‐free	propositions	which	are	deductively	linked	and	law‐like	(see	Aydede	1998;	Toulmin	1972).	
6		Polanyi	(1966)	pointed	to	the	role	played	by	this	 ‘tacit’	knowledge	while	Holton	(1988)	went	one	step	further	by	
showing	how	scientists,	consciously	or	not,	use	highly	motivating,	very	general	thematic	‘presuppositions’	–	or	what	
Gadamer	(2004)	simply	called	‘prejudices’.	
7		Though	 this	 point	 will	 be	 dealt	 with	 in	 a	 later	 paper,	 this	 points	 to	 even	more	 difficult	 issues	 for	 quantitative	
criminology	 raised	 by	 problems	 being	 revealed	 in	 bio‐medical	 research,	 long	 admired	 as	 exemplifying	 the	 ‘gold	
standard’	 for	 high	 quality	 explanatory‐cum‐predictive	 research.	 Ioannides	 (2005)	 proposition	 that	 there	 was	
‘increasing	concern	 that	most	published	[biomedical]	 research	 findings	are	 false’	has	proved	a	useful	stimulus	 in	
that	 field.	As	 Ioannides	 (2005:	126)	noted:	 ‘…	 the	high rate	of	non‐replication	 (lack	of	 confirmation)	of	 research	
discoveries	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 convenient,	 yet	 ill‐founded	 strategy	 of	 claiming	 conclusive	 research	 findings	
solely	on	the	basis	of	a	single	study	assessed	by	formal	statistical	significance,	typically	for	a	p‐value	less	than	0.05’.	
8		This	 proposition	 is	 clearly	 less	 applicable	 to	 some	 fields	 of	 science	 than	 others:	 fundamental	 physics	 remains	 a	
cauldron	of	 ‘anomalous’	data	and	theoretical	pluralism	as	Smollin’s	(2013)	recent	attempt	to	 ‘de‐relativize’	 ‘time’	
suggests.		
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